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SOME THOUGHTS ON CIVIL JUSTICE
REFORM%
Samuel C. Butler**
I am very grateful for the honor being paid me, partly because I am
joining a long line of distinguished members of the Bar who were earlier honorees, many of whom are old friends, colleagues, and esteemed opponents. But also because of my deep and longstanding
admiration for Judge Learned Hand who, when I was in law school
and starting practice, was by a wide margin the most respected judge
in the United States. I never met Judge Hand, but I have the full
measure of reverence of my generation for his wisdom and judgment
and his strongly held views on judicial restraint. So it is with especial
humility that I accept this award given in his memory.
When reading Gerry Gunther's wonderful biography of Judge
Hand some months ago, I learned that on January 29, 1955, Judge
Hand received an award from the American Jewish Committee and
used that event as an opportunity to give a memorable speech on civil
liberties, human rights, and the continuing evils of McCarthyism. 1 As
a result, the AJC decided, after Judge Hand's death, to grant an award
annually in his name.
While my concerns tonight are not as fundamental as was Judge
Hand's defense of civil liberties to a similar audience forty-one years
ago, I am troubled, and believe Judge Hand would be, by both the
sharp decline in respect and trust that the general public has for lawyers and adverse developments in our legal system, all since his death
more than three decades ago. Recent polls have suggested that thirty* These Remarks were delivered upon the presentation of The American Jewish
Committee's Judge Learned Hand Human Relations Award to Samuel C. Butler on
February 28, 1996.
** Samuel C. Butler has been associated with Cravath, Swaine & Moore, New
York City, since 1956; he was elected a partner in 1960 and has been the Presiding
Partner since 1980. He graduated from Harvard College in 1951, Phi Beta Kappa and
magna cum laude, and from Harvard Law School in 1954, where he was a member of
the Law Review and received his degree magna cum laude. He was a law clerk to
Justice Sherman Minton in the October 1954 Term of the U.S. Supreme Court and
then served in the U.S. Army.
Mr. Butler was a trustee of Vassar College from 1969-77; an Overseer of Harvard
College from 1982-88, serving as President of the Board in 1987 and 1988; a trustee of
the New York Public Library since 1981; a trustee of the Board of The Culver Educational Foundation since 1981 (a Vice President since 1985); and a trustee of the American Museum of Natural History from 1989-93. He has been a member of the
Securities Regulation Committee of the Bar Association of the City of New York and
a Vice Chairman of its Committee on Minority Recruitment.
Mr. Butler has also served as a director of a number of public companies, including
Ashland, Inc. since 1970, U.S. Trust Corporation since 1972, GEICO Corporation
1971-95, Olin Corporation 1975-82, and Millipore Corporation since 1992.
1. See Gerald Gunther, Learned Hand. The Man and the Judge 591-92 (1994).
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one percent of the American public think lawyers are less honest than
other people, and only five percent want their children to become
lawyers. 2
I think the public generally resents the fact that our legal system has
in some respects been converted into a lottery where a few lucky winners hit the jackpot but most face increased delays in the legal system
and increased costs in using that system and in insuring against its
risks. For example, it has been estimated that in California about
twenty cents of every dollar paid for auto insurance goes to lawyers
and another thirty cents for fraudulent or inflated claims, including
excessive medical treatment.
When an Alabama jury gives $4 million in punitive damages, and
$4000 in compensatory, to a doctor whose BMW was found to have an
undisclosed, partially retouched paint job which he didn't notice for
the first nine months he owned the car.' When a New Mexico jury
awards $2.7 million in punitive and $160,000 in compensatory damages to an eighty-one-year-old woman who sued McDonald's after
having bought a scalding cup of coffee at a drive-in window and then
spilled it when, while holding the cup between her knees, she tried to
remove the top.5 When a Texas jury awards Pennzoil $11 billion because Texaco's higher bid prevented Pennzoil from being able to follow through on a letter of intent to invest $2.5 billion for a minority
interest in Getty.6 Well then, everyone knows our legal system has
gotten out of hand in some respects.
I hasten to add that I am not opposed to all class action suits, product liability suits, or shareholder suits. There are many examples of
great good that has come from each of those types of litigation. For
example, there is no doubt that, in the area of shareholder suits, the
fear of liability has significantly increased the quality of oversight by
directors of public companies.
The common law, as developed in England and America, until fairly
recently involved a system in which the courts established the legal
rules, and the juries found the facts and prescribed damages for injured persons to whom duties had been breached. At the same time
that legal system protected those persons whose non-negligent behavior nonetheless had led to injuries. However, in the last twenty or
thirty years, this legal system has been radically altered. It has largely
2. See Randall Samborn, Anti-Lawyer Attitude Up, Nat'l L.J., Aug. 9, 1993, at 1,
20.
3. See Max Boot, Will Tort Reformers Miss a Golden (State) Opportunity?,Wall
St. J., Feb. 21, 1996, at A15.
4. See Paul M. Barrett, How a Bad Paint Job May Put Brakes on Big Punitive
Awards, Wall St. J., Mar. 9, 1995, at Bi.
5. See Jury Says Coffee Was Too Hot, USA Today, Aug. 19, 1994, at lB.
6. See Thomas C. Hayes, Texaco Must Pay $11 Billion Award, Texas Court Rules,

N.Y. Times, Dec. 11, 1985, at Al. The award was the largest in the history of the
United States civil justice system. lit
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moved away from its common law roots to become a non-fault based
social insurance system interested in transferring vast resources from
actors to passive victims. Rather than merely seeking to compensate
injured persons, it has become an instrument capable of shutting down
entire industries. Rather than being regulated by rules of law that
precluded large numbers of cases from ever getting to juries, it has
given juries, on an increasingly unsupervised basis, the ability to punish actors whose conduct juries find distasteful. And generally those
juries are located in parts of the country where being a juror is a parttime, good job, where neither the plaintiff nor the defendant reside
and where neither the injury nor the alleged wrongful activity occurred. Unhappily, the New York courts may be joining this trend.
Did you see the article in today's New York Times that a Brooklyn
court has ordered a Swiss canton to pay more than $125 billion for
damages allegedly suffered by two felons as a result of the failure of a
tiny bank in that canton in 1967?7
Moreover, despite its much greater role in our society, our legal
system has ignored the decline in morals and the excesses of we lawyers who run the system. It has become a system that powerfully encourages charges of fraud. As a minor example, last August I worked
on three mergers, ABC, CBS, and GEICO. Analysts and shareholders strongly applauded, and eventually overwhelmingly voted for,
each of those transactions. Nonetheless, there were a total of twentytwo lawsuits filed against those companies, all shrilly charging, in the
strongest terms, fraud and abuse of fiduciary duty. Most of these suits
were filed within hours of the first press release announcing each deal;
long before the plaintiffs, or more properly the plaintiffs' lawyers,
knew anything about the matter other than the names of the parties.
Since those suits were started, not one single step has been taken by
the plaintiffs' lawyers to do anything about them, even though all
three mergers have now closed. While not costly to my clients, this
kind of unseemly professional, or may I say unprofessional, behavior
cheapens our profession in the eyes of the public. All they see is an
obscene rush to be first in line at the courthouse just in case anything
remotely resembling a real claim should rear its head.
I think we must search for cures for these abuses which have grown
up in our legal system, but cures which will not endanger the fundamental strengths of that system so that we can return to assuring everyone a swift and fair hearing for their legitimate claims. There are
many possible improvements, and I would like to briefly mention
three.
I believe the time has come for us to try some form of "loser pays."
This so called English Rule is used in virtually every other Western
7. See John Tagiabue, Poor Swiss Get U.S. Bil" $125 Billion and Change, N.Y.
Tunes, Feb. 28, 1996, at A4.
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country.8 Perhaps that's why the English a few years ago had 82 lawyers per 100,000 people, the Germans 111, but we had 281. 9 This rule
is based on fairness, the person who wins should be made whole.
Even more importantly, it makes each side look more carefully at the
merits of its case and more willing to compromise. At the least I
would test the English Rule somewhere in our court system, perhaps
in federal diversity cases or one or two states.
However, limits on the English Rule are certainly needed. One approach would be to cap the amount a losing party would have to pay
to a sum equal to the legal fees that party paid to its own counsel in
that litigation. Without doubt, trial judges must be authorized to limit
or disallow the rule by exercising their discretion in appropriate cases.
There are some types of suits where the Rule should perhaps never
apply, civil rights cases, for example.
There is an interesting variation on the English Rule in which the
defendant, at an early stage in the litigation, would be required to
make a settlement offer. If the plaintiff ultimately collects less than
that offer, it must pay the defendant's legal fees for the period after
the offer was made; on the other hand if the plaintiff collects more, the
defendant must pay the plaintiff's legal fees for the post-offer period.
Even the ABA has, to the best of my knowledge, not yet opposed this
formulation.
As mentioned earlier, a second area of concern to me is the vast
increase in the number and size of punitive damage awards. For example, in Alabama the total amount of punitive damages awarded sky
rocketed 225 times between 1973 and 1993.10 Obviously, in egregious

factual circumstances, punitive damages are appropriate as an effective punishment and a strong deterrent to knowingly bad behavior. A
sensible proposal would be to assess punitive damages only in a separate hearing by the trial judge after the jury verdict, to require some
finding of actual intent and to fix a dollar limit. Legislation adopted
by the House of Representatives last year would have limited punitive
damages to the greater of $250,000 or triple the economic loss, but
would have confined that cap solely to product liability cases." Surely
in this day of concern about medical costs, at least punitive damage
claims in malpractice suits against doctors and hospitals should also be
capped. I hope the Senate will join the House this year in passing
compromise legislation on at least this aspect of tort reform.
8. See Werner Pfennigstorf & Spencer L. Kimball, Legal Service Plans: Approaches to Regulation 508-09 (1977).
9. See A Report from the President's Council on Competitiveness, Agenda for
Civil Justice Reform in America 2 (Aug. 1991) [hereinafter Council on Competitiveness Report].
10. See Dr. Gore and Mr. Slick, Wall St. J., Oct. 11, 1995, at A14.
11. See Neil A. Lewis, House Passes New StandardsLimiting Awards in Civil Suits,
N.Y. Times, Mar. 11, 1995, at Al.
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Finally, we have all heard about or seen "junk" science in the courtroom, so-called expert witnesses whose principal expertise is in serving frequently as a witness. Last November I chaired a dinner at
which a distinguished Second Circuit judge suggested in his speech
that, even without legislation, trial judges could reduce this growing
problem by simply retaining on their own authority an independent,
truly qualified expert. This court-appointed, neutral expert would listen to both parties' expert witnesses and then give the jury his or her
frank appraisal of the medical, scientific, or technical testimony they
had heard from the parties' experts. Last Monday a Wall Street Journal editorial
picked up this concept and urged its use in breast implant
12
litigation.

There are many other actions that could be taken, such as speeding
up and limiting discovery, imposing sanctions on lawyers who file frivolous lawsuits, but neither time nor knowledge permits me to go further.' 3 I am afraid there has been an implicit conspiracy of silence
among lawyers on the topic of abuses in litigation. All lawyers benefit
from lawsuits, whether one principally represents plaintiffs or defendants, but if we don't speak out and encourage fair reforms, something
worse than the current public dislike and distrust of lawyers may
occur.

12. See Truth, Justice and Implants, Wall St. J., Feb. 26, 1996, at A12.
13. Some suggested reforms for speeding up and limiting discovery include a
"loser pays" rule for discovery motions, mandatory early disclosure of core information, and amending the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to establish clear standards
for imposing sanctions upon attorneys who abuse discovery. See Council on Competitiveness Report, supra note 9, §§ 4-6, at 16-19.

